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UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
DISCUSSION OF REMEDIES FOR
VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL UNDER DON'T ASK, DON'T
TELL AND ITS PREDECESSOR,
TOWARD A TRUE RECONCILIATION
ROBERT I. CORREALES

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision by Congress and the Obama administration to
end Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) in the United States Military was
celebrated not only within the gay and lesbian community, but also
throughout much of American society.' While the decision to overturn
DADT represents a significant step forward in the struggle for equality,
the consequences of decades of exclusion, maltreatment, and
discrimination against one of the most vulnerable segments of the U.S.
population cannot be ignored.
While purporting to protect the military's readiness and combat
effectiveness, DADT and the exclusionary policy that preceded it
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destroyed many lives and caused great harm to many others.2 The victims
of these policies experienced and continue to experience the effects of the
denial of opportunity to serve their country and, in many cases,
devastating economic, physical, emotional, and mental injuries. Evidence
discovered during the repeal investigation revealed that despite the
resources invested in defending the policy, even the advocates of DADT
did not believe that the policy served the purposes they were defending.3
Instead, the policy represented both a capitulation to an antiquated and
irrational form of prejudice belonging to a shrinking minority and to the
demonization of a socially unpopular group. As with other dark chapters
in the history of the United States, weak political leadership acquiesced
and enabled the implementation and defense of the exclusionary policies.
The courts, including the Supreme Court, enabled this
discrimination by laying out the legal basis for these policies by
reinforcing the idea that personhood could not be separated from
conduct-leading to devastating consequences for gays and lesbians in
uniform. While the repeal of these exclusionary policies is the most
important step, it alone cannot fully heal the damage caused by decades of
injustice and discrimination. Involuntary separations caused heavy losses
of critical personnel, opportunities, and dreams, in addition to the heavy
psychological harm of those affected.6 Thus, a mutually beneficial
reconciliation is necessary for a military and a country that seeks to move
forward.
By examining another dark chapter in American history-the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II-this Article
makes a moral and legal case for a more complete resolution of harms to
victims of anti-gay military discrimination. The successful reparations
campaign waged by Japanese Americans who were interned during World
War II has provided both inspiration and a helpful blueprint for reparation
movements worldwide.! This article seeks to show that by observing the
2

See discussion infra Part
Ill.

See discussion infra Part VI.D.
4 See discussion infra Part VI.C.

See discussion infra Part VI.A.
6 See infra notes 47-58.

See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social
Healing Through Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 6 n.8 (2009) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Reframing
Redress] (detailing how numerous reparations movements have drawn their inspiration from the
Japanese American reparations experience).
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parallels between these two dark periods, it is clear that DADT's historical
chapter cannot be closed until reparations are paid to those who were
victimized by the policies of exclusion. I argue that any acceptable remedy
must include: a public apology that can help vindicate those who have
been harmed by the discriminatory policy; a process of reinstatement for
those who wish to continue serving; upgrades to the discharge status for
those who were undeserving of a less than honorable discharge; a
reinstatement of benefits resulting from a change of status; a reinstatement
of educational and pension benefits to those who unjustly lost them; and
other remedies commensurate with the harm experienced.
II.

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE
REPEAL OF DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL

In his official statement after the Senate voted to repeal DADT,
President Obama praised the efforts of all political and military leaders
involved. He noted that the end of the exclusionary policy meant that "no
longer would our nation be denied the service of thousands of patriotic
Americans forced to leave the military, despite years of exemplary
performance, because they happen to be gay. And no longer will many
thousands more be asked to live a lie in order to serve the country they
love." 8 As the policy was being dismantled, President Obama urged the
country to recognize that "[s]acrifice, valor and integrity are no more
defined by sexual orientation than they are by race or gender, religion or
creed . .

.9

President Obama's recognition of the sacrifice and valor of gay
service persons helps to frame the discussion for a possible reconciliation
in several important ways. First, the timing of Obama's message provides
an opportunity to reconcile because the harm experienced by the victims
of DADT is recent, and therefore the damages can be more easily
quantified.' 0 Though some victims are no longer alive, many other
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Id.
10See Charles J. Ogletree, Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 279, 291-93 (detailing criticism of the African American
reparation claims by prominent scholars such as Yale Law Professor Boris Bittker in the 1970s,
and more recently, David Horowitz, who argued against reparations for descendants of African
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individuals who were subjected to the effects of the discriminatory policy
can be identified and provided a remedy commensurate with their
suffering. Additionally, Obama facilitated the start of a healing process.
Obama's words revealed that for gay military personnel, the choice to
serve in the military took a different kind of courage and sacrifice.
Although military service requires a great deal of sacrifice from all who
serve, it required gay military personnel to consciously decide to serve in
silence while being exposed to discrimination, possible harassment, and
potential danger from commanders and peers.
Obama's acknowledgement that integrity and valor are no more
defined by sexual orientation than by race, gender, religion or creed also
did several important things. It exonerated gay military personnel from the
accusation that they were somehow morally inferior to those with whom
they served. It expelled the notion that they were guilty of violating the
rights of their bigoted counterparts and superiors. Further, it did away with
the notion that gay military personnel were the cause of their own
maltreatment. In addition, the president's acknowledgement attempted to
restore the dignity and personhood of the individual by finally separating
military performance from sexual orientation, thereby acknowledging that
the military can no longer use a person's sexual identity as a misguided
proxy for that person's ability to contribute to the Nation's security.
Most important, however, was that President Obama's statements
promised a better future for those in uniform, and a more just and effective
military for America. Nonetheless, these statements alone are not enough
to remedy the problems caused by DADT. The wounds left behind by the
devastating consequences of the policy require more than presidential
acknowledgments to heal.
III.

HARMS CAUSED BY DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL

Although it is impossible to fully quantify the economic and
personal harm caused by DADT and its predecessor, these policies have
led to the creation of a vulnerable underclass and the devastation of many
lives. Throughout U.S. history, gays and lesbians have served America's
military with distinction, honor, and valor. They have given their lives and
exposed themselves to danger in every war. They have performed their
duties while knowing that disclosing their true identity, even to their most
American slaves because of the passage of time and the difficulty of identifying actual victims
of slavery).

2012]
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trusted counselors, could lead to their dismissal, as well as irreparable
damage to others. The following stories represent only a small percentage
of the military's repression and maltreatment of gay personnel and
demonstrate the need for a more thoughtful and complete reconciliation.
MAJOR MICHAEL D. ALMY

The story of Michael D. Almy, a former Major in the U.S. Air
Force, is representative of many others whose accomplishments went
unrecognized and whose dreams were shattered by DADT. Speaking as a
witness before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Major Almy
testified about his experience under DADT." Major Almy came from a
family with a rich history of military service.12 His father, a West Point
graduate, retired from the Air Force after serving in Vietnam.' 3 Two of his
uncles served tours of duty in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, one
retiring from the Marines and the other from the Army.14
In addition to having a rich military background, Major Almy was
also very distinguished. He graduated from Reserve Officers' Training
Corps in the top ten percent of all graduates nationally.' 5 In 1993, he was
named the top officer in his unit, which consisted of about 1,000 people.16
During his career, Major Almy was deployed to the Middle East four
times. 17 Toward the end of his deployment, he was named one of the top
officers of his career field within the entire Air Force.' 8
However, neither his background nor his accolades could shield
him from the effects of DADT. While Major Almy was in Iraq, someone
discovered personal e-mails written to his family and friends.' 9 During the
height of the insurgency in Iraq, Major Almy's commander ordered a
search of Major Almy's personal e-mails solely to determine whether he

1 Testimony Relating to the "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy: HearingBefore the Comm. on

ArmedSerys., I1lth Cong. 9-13 (2010) (statement of Michael D. Almy, Former Major, U.S. Air
Force).
12Id at 9.

'3 Id
14

15Id
16 id.
7 Id.
18

Id.

" Id. at 9-10.
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had violated DADT. 2 0 After refusing to comment on the e-mails because
they were personal, Major Almy was relieved of his command of nearly
200 airmen, his security clearance was terminated, and his pay was
partially cut. 2 1 Major Almy's commander noted that the suspension was
not related to his performance or abilities as an officer. 22 Despite letters
written by a commander and several members of his unit that urged for his
reinstatement, Major Almy was discharged under DADT after sixteen
years of service. 23 Furthermore, he received only half the severance pay
that he would have normally received had he been discharged for any
other reason. 24 As a final insult, Major Almy was escorted off of the base
by military police, as if he posed a threat to the military.2 5
After expulsion, Major Almy had a difficult time establishing
himself in life outside of the military.26 Any time he applied for federal
employment, Major Almy was forced to reveal aspects of his personal life
because his discharge documents branded him as having been separated
for "homosexual admission." 2 7 This created a distinct disadvantage when
he applied for new positions.28
Major Almy ended his presentation to the subcommittee by stating:
I only recently decided to come forward with my story as an example of
a career of service to our country cut short by this discriminatory law.
Multiply my story by nearly 14,000, and you begin to understand the
magnitude of this law.

. .

. My greatest desire now is to return to the Air

Force as an officer and a leader, protecting the freedoms of a Nation that
I love, freedoms that I myself was not allowed to enjoy while I was
serving in the military. 29

20

Id at 10.

21 id.
22

id

23 id
24 id
25 id
26

Id at 10-11.

27 id

28 Id. at
29

id

11.
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CORPORAL JUAN PEREZORTIZ

After immigrating to the United States, Corporal Juan Perezortiz
enlisted in the Marine Corps as a way to thank his new country for the
opportunities it had afforded him and his family. 30 While the beginning of
his career blossomed with promotions and praise from his superiors, his
rise was short lived. 3' The arrival of a new sergeant brought turmoil and
fear to Corporal Perezortiz's daily life. 32 The sergeant became suspicious
of Corporal Perezortiz and often expressed his belief that Corporal
Perezortiz was a "faggot." 33 Soon after the sergeant made this belief
known to Corporal Perezortiz's unit, Corporal Perezortiz's evaluation
scores dropped from a 4.9 out of 5 to a 1.0.34 Corporal Perezortiz learned
that favorable evaluations by other superiors were routinely replaced by
his sergeant's lower scores.35 On many occasions Corporal Perezortiz
requested to be transferred out of his unit.36 After numerous letters of
recommendation, the request was finally granted.37 Unfortunately, he was
ordered back to his former unit a few months before his six-year contract
expired. 3 8 Corporal Perezortiz characterized these last few months as
being a "living nightmare," in which he lived in physical fear of his
sergeant. 39 After serving in the Marines for eight years, he chose not to reenlist due to fear of DADT. 4 0 To this day, Corporal Perezortiz continues to
express interest in re-enlisting. 4'
Retelling stories of service people whose lives were damaged by

30 See Letter from Juan C. Perezortiz to President Barack Obama, in Stories from the
Frontline:Letters to PresidentBarack Obama, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK
(Jul. 1, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://www.sidn.org/blog/archives/stories-from-the-frontlines-formermarine-corps-corporal-juan-c.-perez/.
31 Id
32
33
34

d
d

3 Id
36 Id

3 Id
3 Id
3

Id

40 id
41 id
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DADT and its predecessor is crucial to the success of any movement or
legal challenge designed to seek a remedy for decades of discrimination.
Storytelling can recapture the moral high ground of this issue by showing
not only the discrimination suffered by gays and lesbians in uniform, but
also their valor and sacrifice which, contrary to the crude stereotypes used
in defense of exclusion, stand second to none. Major Almy's assessment
that nearly 14,000 others had been similarly harmed is well short of the
actual number.42 Recent figures suggest that the total number of active gay
military personnel is well over 60,000.43 These individuals continue to
serve in secrecy under a threat of separation even though the policy has
been repealed.4 In addition, thousands of others experienced similar
treatment under the former ban. Such stories include tales of harassment,45
intimidation,4 witch hunts,4 7 false accusations,4 physical violence,49

See Testimony Relating to the "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy: Hearing Before the
S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 11.
43 David Wiegand, 'Strange History of Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Review, S.F. GATE (Sept. 17,
2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/tv/article/Strange-History-of-Don-t-Ask-Don-t-Tell-review42

230972 1.php.
4 Id.
45 After midshipman Robert Gaige wore a ribbon supporting AIDS victims, his instructor
not only harassed him, but also encouraged others to do the same until Gaige finally disclosed
his sexual orientation and was discharged. See NATHANIEL FRANK, DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL:
DETAILING THE DAMAGE 9 (Palm Center ed., Aug. 2010).
46 After repeated harassment, such as receiving notes inscribed "Die fag," and, "You can't
hide, fag," Airman Sean Ficci feared for his safety and reported the actions. The investigation
yielded no punishment because Ficci was unable to proffer evidence of his homosexuality. See
id at 10.
47 See Fiona Morgan, Inside a Lesbian "Witch Hunt, " SALON (Jun. 7, 2000, 9:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2000/06/08/lesbians_2/.
48 After being accused of homosexual activity by an adverse party to a money dispute,
the
military discharged Airman Sonya Harden under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" even though she
offered facts of her heterosexuality, including testimony by ex-boyfriends, her former accuser,
and her own statements. FRANK, supra note 45, at 9.
49 Examples of violence include a military commander who relentlessly harassed a female
soldier after men who had assaulted and threatened to rape the soldier told her commander that
she was a lesbian. The threats of imprisonment did not stop even after a military court dismissed
the charges. See id. at 9. In another encounter, a commander decided to investigate an airman for
being gay-which led to her discharge-instead of disciplining two women who attacked her
with punches while screaming, "You sick fucking dyke." Id A third case includes a soldier who
was forced to sleep in his drill sergeant's office because he was beaten and threatened with a
knife when a friend mentioned he might be gay. See Matt Comer, Beaten and Harassed Gay
Soldier
Now
Discharged from
Army,
INTERSTATEQ
(Jan.
6,
2006),
http://www.interstateq.com/archives/524.
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privacy violations,o torture,5 ' and murder.52 These stories also include
accounts of enormous emotional harm to families, 53 loss of salary, 54 the
stigmatizing effects of a less-than-honorable discharge,55 and the loss of
benefits, such as educational benefits, pensions, and health and disability
insurance.56

so An Arabic linguist and language graduate, Bleu Copas, was outed and discharged after
anonymous emails from a suspected jealous lover surfaced. FRANK, supra note 45, at 10.
Military investigators retrieved information from a military person's private America Online
account to confirm the testimony of another shipmate's spouse reported as gay language. See id
at 9. Local police outed a married lesbian military person after they found her marriage
certificate during an investigation of her spouse for a criminal act. The soldier had not come out
to anyone in the military. See id. at 11.
s' Ronald Chapman endured severe beatings from fellow soldiers who suspected he was
homosexual. When he finally reported the abuse, he was discharged even though being a soldier
was his "dream [his] entire life." David Kirby, Another Soldier'sStory, THE ADVOCATE, May 8,
2001, at 27, available at http://goo.gl/EhjWx.
52 Many soldiers have died because of their perceived homosexuality, including August
Provost (shot then set on fire), Michael Goucher (ambushed near his home), Alan Shindler
(beaten to death in a public restroom), and Barry Winchell (beaten to death by a baseball bat on
base). See Repeal and Remembrance: Gay Military Martyrs and the End of DADT, UNFINISHED
LIVES BLOG (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.unfinishedlivesblog.com/2010/12/19/repeal-andremembrance-gay-military-martyrs-and-the-end-of-DADT.
5 See Stories from the Frontlines: A Mother in the Closet, SERVICE MEMBERS LEGAL
DEFENSE NETWORK, http://www.sldn.org/blog/archives/stories-from-the-frontlines-a-mother-inthe-closet/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
54Lt. Col. Steve Loomis never told the army about his homosexuality, simply because they
never asked. Loomis saved his unit from gunfire when they were ambushed in Vietnam. He was
awarded two bronze stars and also received a prestigious purple heart after he was wounded in
battle. Yet, eight days before reaching eligibility for his pension, he was discharged. See
Rebecca Leung, They Didn't Ask; He Didn't Tell, 60 MINUTES (Jul. 9, 2011, 3:36 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/14/60minutes.html.
ss When her partner was diagnosed with lung cancer, Captain Monica Hill explained the
least amount of details of her predicament necessary to request a deferred report date. The air
force investigated her sexual orientation and discharged her a year after her partner died, while
also trying to force Hill to pay back the cost of her medical school scholarship. See Hill,
Monica: Former Captain, U.S. Air Force (1994-2002), SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE
NETWORK, http://www.sldn.org/pages/hill-monica (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). Amy Brian, a
National Guard specialist, lost her educational benefits when she was discharged under DADT.
See Malcolm McClatchy, Woman's DischargeHeightens Debate About Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'
PANTAGRAPH (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/article_61015d70-bbd4-52eea594-6181970cfd59.html.
56 In a letter to President Obama urging him to repeal the law, a mother who referred to
herself as a "mother in the closet" stated that she shared her son's fears of being discovered and
being forced to forfeit a successful military career. In her words: "'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
throws more than just service people into the closet, it throws moms, dads, siblings,
grandparents, friends and loved ones in there as well." The mother did not sign the letter to
President Obama because she was afraid her son would be identified. Letter from A Mother in
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IV. JAPANESE AMERICAN REPARATIONS AS A BLUEPRINT
FOR OTHER MOVEMENTS
Japanese Americans faced a long history of discrimination in
America57 which peaked after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.5 ' At
that point, negative attitudes against Japanese Americans throughout
American society cemented the view that, as a group, they threatened
national security." As a consequence, the government established a
removal and internment policy that imprisoned over 120,000 Japanese
Americans. 60 Internment brought about devastating consequences
including many individuals losing their homes, businesses, communities,
and health. 6 1 The economic greed of some non-Japanese American
competitors facilitated the demonization of anyone of Japanese ancestry
by labeling Japanese people as foreigners without a right to prosper in the
United States, even if they were citizens.62 Discrimination was also made
possible by the United States military's conscious decision to conceal vast
amounts of information that disproved the belief that Japanese Americans
posed a threat to national security. 63
The Japanese American internment program was the result of deep
rooted prejudices, war hysteria, economic self-interest, weak political
leadership and deference to uninformed military judgment.64 The courts
also aided these developments by deferring to military judgment regarding
military necessity.65 Despite the lack of evidence of disloyalty to the
United States, and despite the existence of information to the contrary,
Japanese Americans were collectively determined guilty simply due to
their race, while the government addressed German and Italian national
the Closet to President Barack Obama, Stories From The Frontlines: Letters To President
Barack Obama, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK (Jun. 12, 2011, 4:00 PM),
http://www.sldn.org/blog/archives/stories-from-the-frontlines-a-mother-in-the-closet/.
57See Chad W. Bryan, Precedentfor Reparations? A Look at HistoricalMovements for
Redress and Where Awarding Reparationsfor Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 601-02

(2003).
58

id.

5 See id. See also Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 10 n.29.
6 See Bryan, supra note 57, at 602. See also Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7,
at 10 n.29 (referring to the 120,000 Japanese Americans interned during WWII).
Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 10 n.29.
62See Bryan, supra note 57, at 601.
63id

See Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 1-6.
65 Id at 12
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security concerns on the individual level.66 Lieutenant General John L.
DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command and one of the architects
of the internment initiative, best summarized the visceral racism against
the Japanese at the time:
I have little confidence that the enemy aliens are law abiding and loyal in
any sense of the word. Some of them yes; many, no. Particularly the
Japanese, I have no confidence in their loyalty whatsoever. I am
speaking now of the native born Japanese,-1 17,000-and 42,000 in
California alone. In the war in which we are now engaged, racial
affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy
race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on
United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship have become
"Americanized" the racial strains are undiluted.... You needn't worry
about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the
Germans, except in individual cases. But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and
espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in this areaproblems which I don't want to worry about.6 7
Professor Eric Yamamoto and other prominent scholars extensively
chronicled the Japanese American Reparations movement.6 ' The
movement began in the late 1960s when Japanese Americans launched a
multilayered campaign of public education and legislative initiatives. 69
Ethnic studies programs that taught the story of the Japanese American
experience and support from other ethnic and religious groups greatly
benefited the movement.70 However, the movement also found a
formidable obstacle in Supreme Court precedents that essentially
foreclosed a litigation-based remedy.
In 1943, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hirabayashi v. United
States that the curfew and exclusion orders imposed on Japanese
Americans were constitutional.7 2 The Court based its ruling on national
security and military necessity, deferring to military judgment that

See Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 10 n.29.
ERIC YAMAMOTO & LIANN EBESUGAWA, A Report on Redress: The JapaneseAmerican
Internment, in The Handbook of Reparations 257, 261 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Report on Redress] (quoting testimony of Lieutenant General John De Witt).
68 See generally Yamamoto, Reframing Redress,
supra note 7.
69
Id at 12.
6

67

71

See id. at 20.

72 Hirabayashi

v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943).
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Japanese Americans constituted a threat to national security. 73 The
following year, in Korematsu v. United States,74 the Court again ruled to
deprive Japanese Americans of their rights, once again finding that the
internment program was constitutional due to national security and
military necessity.
According to Professor Yamamoto and others who have chronicled
the Japanese American reparations movement, the movement did not gain
a firm foothold until the Supreme Court vindicated the petitioners' names
in the Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases.75 Those two cases finally
established that the government had manufactured the justification for the
internment program, and allowed both sides to begin the process of
forgiveness and reconciliation.76 Legislative initiatives kept the issue
before Congress, and in 1988, President Reagan signed into law the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988.78 The new law required a formal apology by the
United States government and provided a financial remedy of $20,000 to
each living Japanese American who was interned during World War II.79
The 1988 Civil Liberties Act was unprecedented in American
History. The Act officially recognized the breakdown of democratic ideals
and near-blind deference to the military in a time of crisis, resulting in an
incalculable loss of property, jobs, and community.80 It was also the
vehicle by which the government attempted to repair the devastating effect
of racism and war hysteria on a vulnerable racial group that was
aggressively cast as foreign and disloyal during World War 11.81 The Act
symbolized the institutional restructuring that both cemented the gains of
the movement and made it more difficult to repeat the reprehensible

7 Id.
74Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
7s See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 477, 489-90 (1998) (This article discusses the importance of
the Korematsu and Hirabayashicases. Yamamoto focuses on the fact that federal courts, after
the internment of Japanese Americans, acknowledged that both the Justice and War departments
were involved in destroying key evidence and "lied to the Supreme Court about the military
necessity for the internment.").
76 Id

7 Bryan, supra note 57, at 602-03.
7 See Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 16-17.
so See Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7, at 10 n.29 (a detailed discussion of the
various components of the Japanese American internment episode).
' Id. at 14.
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conduct. 8 2 The government also demonstrated through the Act its
willingness to finally recognize the magnitude of harm caused by its
discriminatory policies, as well as its ability to accept responsibility to
repair the personal, economic, and psychological damages suffered by its
victims. 8 3 Perhaps most importantly, the Act represented the government's
recognition of the inherent value of restoring the human dignity of a group
that was brutalized, stigmatized, and vilified by the government's
discriminatory policies. 84
V.

PARALLELS BETWEEN INTERNMENT POLICY AND DON'T
ASK, DON'T TELL

In an earlier article, I examined the history of DADT to determine
the policy's defensibility in light of the legal, social, political, and military
context under which it was enacted. I concluded that the many
justifications offered for its passage did little to mask the true motivation
behind the exclusionary policy.86 Indeed, the new law was carefully
crafted to leave the former ban untouched and in fact made things even
worse for gays in uniform. 87 My study of the legislative history of DADT
revealed that, as was the case with the Japanese American internment, the
impetus behind the policy was a high level of deference to the judgment of
military leaders.88 These leaders packaged their disapproval of gays in
uniform in the form of deference to the sensibilities of a small number of
individuals who objected to the presence of known gays and lesbians
amongst them. 89 Military leaders themselves confirmed these findings in
discussions and subsequent public statements that lead to the repeal of
DADT. 90
82See generally Yamamoto, Reframing Redress, supra note 7.
8' Id at 34.

8 Id. at 37 n.193.
85 Robert Correales, Don 't Ask, Don't Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 413, 415-16 (2008) [hereinafter Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell].
86
Id at 460.
87
Id at 419.
88 Id at 414. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (explaining the
court's reasoning for its deference to military leaders in permitting the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II, superseded by statute, Pub. L. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903
(arguing the appropriateness of deference to military judgment in the face of a perceived
immediate threat to national security)).
89 Correales, Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, supra note 85, at 414.
9 See Nathaniel Frank, What was the Role of Moral Opposition to Homosexuality in the
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The legislative discussions and subsequent court decisions
upholding DADT parallel the events of the Japanese curfew, forced
removal, and internment during World War 11.91 In each case, the
government faced the task of defending a discriminatory policy that
affected deeply, and in many cases devastatingly, the lives of countless
people. The government chose to ignore significant evidence pointing to
the indefensibility of proposed policies, as well as overlook and
sometimes hide evidence that would undermine the discriminatory
policy. 92 However, in each case, the government was able to right its
course and reverse itself. In the case of Japanese Americans who were
harmed by government removal policies, the government made an effort
to provide at least a partial remedy for these harms. 93
According to President Clinton, DADT represented a reasonable
compromise between those who supported an outright ban of gays and
lesbians in the military and those who advocated for integration. 94
However, careful analysis of the political and military context at the time
reveals that the policy was merely a capitulation to the uninformed,
intolerant opinions and political muscle of a stubborn military that refused
to change.95 Not surprisingly, the new policy changed virtually nothing.96
In place of an outright ban, military and political leaders replaced a bad
law with a legal fiction in which gays and lesbians would no longer be
barred from service because of their sexual orientation, but would be
barred if they engaged in homosexual conduct.97
Debate over "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"?, UNFRIENDLY FIRE/PALM CENTER RESEARCH PORTAL,
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013); see also
http://www.unfriendlyfire.org/research/q7.htm
DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, PENTAGON REPORT: REPEAL OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T
TELL" CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY, INITIATED IMMEDIATELY (Dec. 1, 2010),
available at http://dpc.senate.gov/docs/sr- 111-2-174.pdf.
91 See Robert M. Chesney, NationalSecurity Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REv. 1361, 138283 (2009).
92 See Children of the Camps: Internment History, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/childofcamp
/history/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013); see Nathaniel Frank, What Damage is Caused by
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell"?, UNFRIENDLY FIRE/PALM CENTER RESEARCH PORTAL,
http://www.unfriendlyfire.org/research/q4.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
9 See Children of the Camps: Internment History,supra note 92.
94 BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 485 (2004).
95 See BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 483-86 (2004) (President Clinton explains the
overwhelming opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a veto-proof resolution in the House
opposing repeal of the ban, and similar opposition in the Senate, causing him to fall well short of
lifting the ban.).
96
Id. at 485.
See 10 U.S.C-

§ 654

(2006).
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Homosexual conduct was broadly defined in DADT to include
many actions that indicated a person's sexual orientation as gay or
lesbian.98 To eliminate the threat to military readiness due to homosexual
conduct, the policy provided that a service member could be removed for:
(1) homosexual acts; (2) marrying or attempting to marry a person of the
same sex, or; (3) for stating one's sexual orientation to be homosexual. 99
In fact, the revelation of a person's sexual orientation raised a rebuttable
presumption that the person was a homosexual, which, unless rebutted, led
to their discharge from the military.100 Under the policy, "homosexual"
was defined as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts. . . ."1o1 The law was thus cleverly designed to create a

trap in which a person's sexual identity personified the individual, thereby
perpetuating the outright ban, while purporting to allow homosexuals to
serve in the military.

VI. THE MISGUIDED JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE COURTS,
CONGRESS, AND MILITARY
A.

LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO JUSTICE: JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION

The conflation of homosexual identity and sexual conduct that could
be criminalized received Supreme Court approval in Bowers v. Hardwick,
in which the Court considered an appeal by the state of Georgia of a facial
challenge to a statute that criminalized sodomy.102 In many ways,
Hardwick was to the gay community what Korematsu was to Japanese
Americans.10 3 Revealing its animus and disdain toward same-sex
relationships, the Court ignored the fact that both heterosexual and
homosexual couples could be prosecuted under the Georgia statute

" See id.

* Id. § 654(b)(1)-(3).
10 See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 937 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., concurring).
101
10 U.S.C. §654(f)(1) (2005).
102Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Lawrence Kent Mendenhall, Note, Misters Korematsu and Steffan: The Japanese
Internment and the Military's Ban on Gays in the Armed Forces, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 196, 225103

26 (1995).
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(indeed, a heterosexual couple, John and Mary Doe, had joined Michael
Hardwick, a gay man, in challenging the statute).104 The court instead
focused on homosexual sexual conduct, framing the issue as whether "the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy. . . ."io0
While sidestepping the issue of decisional privacy,106 the Court
justified its decision to allow states to criminalize homosexual conduct by
comparing gays and lesbians to criminals who commit adultery, incest,
and other sexual crimes.' 0 7 Adding to the brutal debasement of gays and
lesbians in the majority opinion, Justice Burger's concurring opinion
continued to frame the issue before the Court as one involving criminal
conduct of the worst kind. 08 Relying on a gratuitous reference to
Blackstone, which had described "'the infamous crime against nature' as
an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention
of which is a disgrace to human nature,"' Justice Burger further
demonized those who engage in same-sex relationships as the moral
equivalents of criminals of the most reprehensible type, for example
adulterers, incestuous relatives, and rapists.' 0 9
Following Hardwick, moral condemnation of gay relationships in
the military enjoyed early judicial support in the lower courts and in case
after case. In Dronenburgv. Zech, Judge Robert Bork rejected privacy and
equal protection arguments in the case of a highly decorated gay officer
who had been discharged from the Navy under the former ban." 0 In a
manner similar to Hardwick, Bork drew a comparison between same-sex
consensual sexual conduct and all other types of sexual conduct,
presumably even rape and pedophilia, when he stated: "[w]e would find it
impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct is
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' unless any
and all private sexual behavior falls within those categories, a conclusion
we are unwilling to draw.""' In Stephan v. Cheney, Judge Gasch rejected
a challenge to the former ban, finding that regulations regarding forced

Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.
at 190.
1o6id at 190-91.
10

1osId

'07 Id at 195-96.
1osId at 197 (Burger, J., concurring).
1o9Id
110Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
"1 Id at 1396 (emphasis added).
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separation of homosexuals were rationally related to the military's interest
in protecting soldiers and sailors from AIDS, a position that had not been
advanced by the military in that case." 2 In Schowengerdt v. United States,
another case arising under the former ban, the Ninth Circuit declared that
Hardwick foreclosed a substantive due process challenge to the policy." 3
Similarly, in Woodward v. United States, the Federal Circuit denied
claims of violation of equal protection and due process based on
Hardwick, stating: "[w]e agree with the court in Padula v. Webster that
'there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class criminal."'114 The Seventh
Circuit reached a similar result in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, a case
challenging the former ban, in which the court relied on Hardwick to
declare that the class of homosexual persons could not invoke heightened
scrutiny when the conduct defining the class could be constitutionally
criminalized." 5 Furthermore, in Pruitt v. Cheney, the Ninth Circuit struck
down a challenge to the old ban on similar grounds." 6
B.

CONGRESSIONAL AND MILITARY ANIMUS

The collapse of gay and lesbian personhood into sexual conduct
that could be criminalized, which was devised by the lower courts and
ratified in Hardwick, was reflected in the legal and moral arguments made
by supporters of a gay ban during Congressional deliberations. In an
exchange with Senator John Kerry, who supported lifting the ban, Senator
Strom Thurmond stated, "[h]omosexuals practice sodomy. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice and many states have provisions against sodomy.
How would you reconcile the situation with homosexuals in the
military?""' 7 Senator Kerry responded, "[m]ake it consistent for
heterosexuals and homosexuals. Whatever the standard is going to be, and
apply it appropriately.""' 8 To which Thurmond replied, "[h]eterosexuals

12

Stephen v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 13-16 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v.

Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'don reh'g en banc sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677

(D.C. Cir. 1994).
13 Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991).
114Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
115Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989).
1 Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).
117Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the S. Comm.

on Armed Serys., 103rd Cong. 493 (1993) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond).
Id. (statement of Sen. John Kerry, Member, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.).
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do not admit they practice sodomy.... Homosexuals do."' 1 9
Anti-gay animus that focused exclusively on threats to what
Professor Kenneth Karst once described as "the pursuit of manhood"
fueled opposition to gay and lesbian open service.' 2 0 Curiously, several
members of Congress focused on a fear of AIDS to condemn open service
by gays and lesbians, ignoring the fact that lesbians are the lowest risk
group for that disease, and that the military has a stringent program of
medical screening for people in uniform. Speaking in opposition to the
new policy, Senator Robert Smith stated, "[p]romiscuity, already a major
health problem in the homosexual community, will likely increase in onbase clubs, local nightclubs, and throughout forces deployed worldwide.
While some may dismiss this threat as exaggerated, the reality is that such
promiscuity could have a very direct impact on the incidence of sexually
transmitted diseases within the Armed forces."l2 1 Similarly, Senator Frank
Murkowski insisted that the decision to open doors to gays and lesbians
"will not be a free one. That decision will be paid for in increased funding
for VA, or by the veterans VA must turn away in order to care for the new
AIDS cases the decision will bring."' 22 Other members of Congress
framed their intolerance of gays and lesbians in religious and moral terms.
Representative Floyd Spence characterized "the homosexual lifestyle" as
"unnatural and immoral." 2 3 Representative Duncan Hunter said the policy
was "necessary" because "we had homosexual activities with
nonconsenting young people in the military go up at a rapid rate." 24 He
warned that the real reason for his amendment, which would have codified
the practice of inquiring about the sexual orientation of military members,
was Congress' duty to their constituents to protect their children in
uniform. 2 1
The disdain expressed by Congressional leaders was in many ways
exceeded by military leaders who spoke candidly about their contempt for
gays and lesbians. General Norman Schwarzkopf stated that lifting the ban

19 Id. (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
120 See Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed

Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499, 500-01, 545-47 (1991).
121139 CONG. REC. 2169 (1993) (statement of
Sen. Robert Smith).

122Id. at 2175 (statement of Sen. Frank Murkowski).
123
Id at 22,724 (statement of Rep. Floyd Spence).
124Id at 22,743 (statement of Rep. Duncan
Hunter).
125Id.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

2012]

19

would simply "destroy the military."1 2 6 Admiral Thomas Moorer, a former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saw military service by gays and
lesbians as an affront to middle-American values that he believed drove
the military to success.12 7 In a statement revealing the enormity of his
ignorance, Moorer argued that service by gay personnel would downgrade
the moral fiber of the military because their uncontrollable sexual urges
and unmistakable effeminate characteristics would render them ineffective
as soldiers or military leaders.12 8 He added that excluding gays and
lesbians from service was essential to protecting the sensibilities and
morale of military wives, as well as to protecting the military from carriers
of the most reprehensible type of natural punishment for an immoral
lifestyle.129
The candid and open disclosure of negative political and military
attitudes toward gays and lesbians in uniform was not surprising, given the
leverage enjoyed by those leaders who supported DADT during Clinton's
presidency. Partially motivated by the death of U.S. Navy Seaman Allen
Shindler, who was murdered because of his sexual orientation, Clinton had
promised to lift the ban if elected.130 However, the public hostility and
political bullying that followed after the election undermined his ability to
govern, not only in military affairs, but in all areas of politics.131 Clinton
was faced with a threat from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to resign en masse if
he persisted on eliminating the ban via an executive order.132 He was also
portrayed as a draft dodger with no standing to dictate policy to the

126 139 CONG. REC. 2170 (1993) (statement of Sen. Robert Smith, quoting Gen.
Norman
Schwarzkopf).
127Proposal to End the Ban on Gays in the Military: Hearing of the Republican
Research
Committee's Task Force on Military Personnel (Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Admiral Thomas
Moorer), available at http://dont.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/RRCTFOMPappendixH.pdf.
128 id.
129

d

About "Don't Ask Don't Tell," SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE
NETWORK,
http://www.sldn.org/pages/about-dadt (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
131 See The Clinton Years, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
30

clinton/chapters/3.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
132 See Gays and the Military, NEWSWEEK

MAG., Jan. 31, 1993, available at
James
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1993/01/31/gays-and-the-military.html;
Kirchick, Colin Powell's Cowardly 'Evolution' on Gay Marriage, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 31,
2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/colin-powell-convenient-cowardly-evolution-gaymarriage-article- 1.1087411.
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nation's honorable military leadership. 33 Not surprisingly, Clinton's
"compromise" changed essentially nothing.13 4
C.

EVIDENCE IGNORED

Concerned about the one-sided political bullying and lack of
objectivity during the Congressional debate over the policy, Senator Ted
Kennedy filed a separate statement to preserve a record of the hearings in
some detail.' 35 Importantly, Kennedy pointed out that the Senate Armed
Services Committee had called on experts who relied on anecdotal
evidence while ignoring primary research on both the constitutional and
practical implications of the issue. 136 Though the committee had
conducted some discussion of the constitutional issues related to the
policy, Kennedy pointed out that the committee failed to discuss the key
Supreme Court cases relevant to this issue.13 7 With a great deal of dismay,
Kennedy also noted that the committee had never called the authors of two
studies commissioned by the Department of Defense to give them an
opportunity to testify.138 Both studies, relying on data from other countries
and from the experiences of other paramilitary organizations in the United
States, had concluded that gays and lesbians could serve openly without
negative consequences to others in uniform.' 39 Lastly, and perhaps most
importantly, Kennedy also revealed that he had received over 100
testimonials from heterosexual and homosexual individuals, all of whom
were affiliated with Norfolk Naval Base.140 All 100 individuals opposed
the ban, but feared persecution if their names were revealed.' 4 1 According
to Kennedy, many of those individuals recounted in detail the atmosphere
of fear and coercion that existed on military bases while the lifting the ban
was being considered, thus precluding an open discussion of issues related

133Proposal to End the Ban on Gays in the Military: Hearingof the Republican Research
Committee's Task Force on Military Personnel (Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Rear Admiral
Robert Spiro, Jr., United States Naval Reserve), available at http://dont.law.stanford.edu
/wp-content/uploads/201 0/1 /RRCTFOMP-appendixH.pdf.
134BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 486 (2004).
135139 CONG. REc. 20,622 (1993).

1 Id.
13 Id. at 20,625.
140

Id. at 20,626.

141id
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to the ban.142
D.

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CONFIRMS DISCRIMINATORY
ANIMUS BEHIND THE BAN

Nathaniel Frank, a Senior Research Fellow at the Palm Center, has
researched the issue of open service by gays in the military.143 Frank's
research for his book Unfriendly Fire included recent interviews of the
architects of DADT.144 Speaking to members and advisors of the Military
Working Group (MWG), which crafted the policy, Frank learned about the
intellectual dishonesty that defined the exercise.145 Minter Alexander, the
general who initially headed the MWG admitted that the group did not
fully understand the meaning of "sexual orientation."146 He also admitted
that the group "did not have any empirical data" so the conclusions they
reached were purely subjective.147 One group staffer, who had supplied a
wealth of research to the MWG said his data was never considered, and
that the policy was created behind closed doors by people who were
opposed to lifting the ban.14 8 Frank also reports that Senator Sam Nunn,
the Congressional architect of the ban, manipulated the hearings by
removing two witnesses who he knew were opposed to the ban: retired
Colonel Lucian Truscott and former Senator Barry Goldwater, who once
famously said: "I don't care whether my fellow soldiers are straight or
gay, I only care that they shoot straight." 4 9 Senator Nunn then replaced
them with a general who was known as a virulent homophobe.150
In addition, Frank reports that in an interview with Rear Admiral
John Hutson, a former Judge Advocate of the Navy who participated in
discussions about whether to lift the ban, he learned that the assessment of

142

id
143 NATHANIEL FRANK,
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115-16 (2009).
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Id. at 116.
146Id. at 115.
147Id. at 116.
148Id. at 115.
149 Adam Clymer, Barry Goldwater is Dead at 89; Conservatives' Standardbearer, N.Y.
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gay service was "based on nothing. It wasn't empirical, it wasn't studied,
it was completely visceral, intuitive."i' According to Frank, Hutson
concluded that the policy was rooted "in our own prejudices and our own
fears." 52 Lastly, Frank reports that Lieutenant Colonel Robert McGinnis,
a deeply homophobic evangelical who went on to become vice-president
of the Family Research Council, worked hard to couch the discussion in
secular terms because he knew that this approach would be more effective
than biblical arguments against equal treatment for gays.
VII. IS THERE A LEGAL BASIS FOR REMEDIES FOR HARMS
SUFFERED UNDER DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL?
In a 1998 article on reparations, Professor Eric K. Yamamoto noted
that one of the major impediments to reparations in the case of Japanese
Americans was the lack of a traditional legal principle upon which to base
the claims.15 4 According to Professor Yamamoto, "despite hindsight
recognition of historical injustice, government actors opposed to
reparations cited the Supreme Court's constitutional validation of the
internment in Korematsu v. United States."15 5 Indeed, Yamamoto
observed that it was not until the Supreme Court decided Korematsu and
Hirabayashi that the redress movement regained its political
momentum.156
Fortunately for victims of DADT, the most recent trend in the law
favors legal redress for harms inflicted under the policy. In A Dying Policy
I argued that the policy could be challenged under a "searching rational
basis" test.' 5 7 I based my argument on the Supreme Court's decisions in
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,'58 City of Cleburne v.
CleburneLiving Center,15 9 Romer v. Evans,16 0 and the Court's more recent

...Idat 123.
152id

's3 Id at 38.
154See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations,supra note
75, at 490.
ss Id. at 489.
156id
1 Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, supra note 85,
158United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,

at 442-47.
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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decision in Lawrence v. Texas.161
I argued that a legal challenge to the policy would present a
prototypical case of animus-based discrimination.162 Continued trends in
the lower courts, and a recent decision by the Obama Justice Department
not to defend challenges to the federal Defense of Marriage Act reinforce
the idea that a remedy for real-world effects of the policy may now be
available through the courts. The emerging jurisprudence on animus-based
discrimination and the new position of the Obama Justice Department
represents a changing view of discrimination against politically unpopular
groups, and may portend a nascent trend in which courts will begin
applying a heightened level of scrutiny to classifications based on sexual
orientation. Below, I recount some of the analysis from A Dying Policy as
a predicate for this possible emerging trend.
In Moreno, the Court struck down legislation that was intended to
discriminate against hippies, despite the fact it was facially
nondiscriminatory.163 In amending the Food Stamp Act of 1964:
Congress chose to exclude from the food stamp program any household
containing unrelated individuals. Applying a "searching" rational basis
test, the Court determined that whether a person is related to other
members of a household was clearly irrelevant, and indeed ran contrary
to the policies behind the statute. Relying on a Conference Report and a
statement on the floor of the Senate, the Court concluded that the
purpose of the 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act was to exclude
"hippies" and "hippie communes" from the food stamp program. The
Court then declared that "a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest."1 64
Next, the Court in Cleburne rejected a zoning ordinance that required
group homes for the mentally ill to get a special use permit while others
could operate freely.'66 The Court ruled that the mentally ill "were
protected from this type of invidious discrimination. Invoking ... Moreno,
the Court held that '[t]he state may not rely on a classification whose
relationship to its asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction

U.S. 558 (2003).
Correales, Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, supra note 85.
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

16 Lawrence v. Texas, 539
162 See
163See

i6 Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, supra note 85, at 442-43 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at
529, 534).
165See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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arbitrary or irrational."' 1 66 Moreover, the rationale for requiring special
use permits stemmed, the Court acknowledged, from "stereotypes of
people with mental retardation and paternalism toward that group."1 67
Regardless of the motivation, the Court concluded that "such negative
attitudes and fears do not provide legitimate reasons for discrimination,
[and therefore] . . . the ordinance violated equal protection, even under the

rational basis test."1 68
Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
"reminded the Court that its rational basis analysis was 'most assuredly
not the rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.'
Instead, it was a much more searching inquiry into the legitimacy of the
justifications given by the state for its classifications."l 69
Nearly a decade after Cleburne, the Court in Romer' 7 0 held that a
Colorado state referendum which barred state and local governments from
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation-known as
Amendment 2-violated the equal protection clause. 17 1 Colorado claimed
Amendment 2 "was merely designed to place gays and lesbians in the
same position as all other persons, by denying homosexuals special
rights."1 72 However, the Court found such a reading implausible, and
pointed out Amendment 2's sweeping nature. 17 3 "The Amendment was not
only intended to nullify specific legal protections, but was also designed to
forbid reinstatement of those laws and policies, putting gays and lesbians
in a solitary class."1 74 The Court:
[R]ecognized the modem trend in anti-discrimination laws that were
designed to remedy Congress' inability to protect individuals against
some types of discrimination.

. .

. [T]he Court stressed that Amendment

2 not only barred homosexuals from securing protection under the public
accommodation laws, but also "nullified specific legal protections for
166Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, supra note 85, at 443 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
446).
167 Id

168Id. at 444.
169Id. at 444 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J. concurring in part, dissenting
in part)).
170
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
171Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, supra note 85, at 444-45 (citing Romer, 517 U.S.
at
623-26, 635).
172Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, supra note 85, at 445 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 626).
173Id (citing Romer, 517 U.S. 626-27).
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this targeted class in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate,
insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and
employment."
. . . Rejecting the state's position that the law did nothing more than

deny homosexuals "special rights," the Court found nothing "special" in
the rights denied by the Amendment. Instead, the Court pointed out that
Amendment 2 denied homosexuals basic protections taken for granted
by most people. The Amendment thus created a class of outsiders, with
few basic protections.
The Court [thus] concluded that Amendment 2 did not satisfy rational
basis analysis because the Amendment imposed a "broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group." . . .
... [T]he Court concluded that Amendment 2, and laws like it, "raise the
inevitable inference that the disadvanta e imposed is borne of animosity
toward the class of persons affected."' 7
In A Dying Policy I concluded that:
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer illustrate attempts to legislate against a
perceived moral or character flaw that does not generally exist in the
realm of "traditional" (but uninformed) societal values. In each of those
cases the Court rejected unsupported justifications for the discriminatory
state action. A mere religious objection to homosexuals in Romer could
not justify invidious discrimination against that group. The fear of people
with mental illness did not support state discrimination in Cleburne. And
the image of the moral superiority of a nuclear family could not support
denying a most basic public benefit in the form of food stamps in

Moreno.
In each of those cases, the invidiousness of the discrimination and the
magnitude of the harm on a politically unpopular group moved the Court
to reject the unsupported justifications offered by the state. In those cases
the court found that if the statute is "a status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which [courts] could discern a relationship
to legitimate state interest," the statute must be found to violate the
rationality test under equal protection. Significantly, those cases have
generated a growing array of lower court decisions consistent with those
principles.
[Despite the court's findings in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer], courts
have stressed that, absent a suspect class or a fundamental right, the

..
5 Id. at 445-46 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. 629-34).
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proper constitutional test continues to be traditional rational basis
analysis. Ironically, to make that point, courts responding to challenges
to Don't Ask, Don't Tell have relied on cases that stand for exceptions to
traditional rational basis review such as Cleburneand Romer. Applying a
run-of-the-mill rational basis test those courts concluded that heightened
judicial scrutiny did not apply to constitutional challenges to the
policy.'I
However, things may be about to change.

VIII. RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW TEND TO FAVOR LEGAL
REDRESS FOR THE HARMS CAUSED BY
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL
In addition to the Supreme Court's overruling of Hardwick in
Lawrence v. Texas, 177 a recent development in the Obama Justice
Department provides insight into a legal trend and a new government

approach to cases involving discrimination based on DADT. In a letter to
Congress dated February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.

announced that the U.S. Justice Department will no longer be defending
cases brought by legally-married same-sex couples 78 challenging the
constitutionality of section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act. 17 9 According
to Holder, the administration defended DOMA in jurisdictions that applied
rational basis review to matters involving sexual orientation. 10 But, based
on an analysis of relevant Supreme Court cases, Holder and Obama
concluded that "classifications based on sexual orientation warrant
heightened scrutiny."'' Justice Marshall's observation in Cleburne that
the Supreme Court was really applying heightened scrutinyl82 may prove

prophetic, as Holder agreed that "the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual

Correales, supra note 85, at 442-50 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
178 See Letter from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., to John Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of
Rep. on Litig. Involving the Def. of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), in U.S. JUST. DEP'T,
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/February/I I-ag-223.html.
1' Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
180id.
176
17

181id.
182 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 456 (Marshall, J. concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
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orientation."' 83
According to Holder, the proper standard for cases involving sexual
orientation requires courts to consider: (1) whether the group in question
has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) whether individuals "exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishable characteristics that define them as
a discrete group"; (3) whether the group is a minority or is politically
powerless; (4) and whether the characteristics distinguishing the group
have little relationship to legitimate policy objectives or to individuals'
"ability to perform or contribute to society."l 84
Each of those factors, Holder stated, counsels for suspiciousness of
classifications based on sexual orientation: (1) the government's
significant history of intentional discrimination against gay and lesbian
people by the government and private entities "based on prejudice and
stereotypes that continue to have ramifications today";' 85 (2) a growing
scientific consensus accepts the immutability of sexual orientation,186 4so
it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual orientation to be hidden from
view to avoid discrimination";' 8 7 (3) "the adoption of laws like those at
issue in Romer . . . and Lawrence, the longstanding ban on gays and

lesbians in the military, and the absence of a federal law for employment
protection for sexual orientation show the group to have limited political
power,"188 and; (4) "there is a growing acknowledgement that sexual
orientation "bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society."l 89 Holder concluded that "recent evolutions in legislation
(including the pending repeal of DADT), in community practices and
attitudes, in case law (including the Supreme Court's holdings in
Lawrence and Romer) and in social science regarding sexual orientation
all make clear that sexual orientation is not a characteristic that generally
bears on legitimate policy objectives." 90 Holder's analysis of the proper

183 Letter from Eric Holder, supra note 178.
184Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.

587, 602-03 (1987), and Cleburne, 473 U.S. at

441-42 (1985)).
Id. ("Indeed, until very recently, states have "demean[ed] the[] existence" of gays and
lesbians "by making their private sexual conduct a crime.") (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003)).
186Id (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 101 (1992)).
187Id (citing Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111 321, 124 Stat.

3515 (2010)).
188Id(
189Id (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality).
190Id.
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standard for discriminatory classifications based on sexual orientation was
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States,19 1
in which the court allowed the policy to remain but enjoined further
discharges pending repeal. 192
IX. A TRUE RECONCILIATION STRATEGY AFTER REPEAL OF
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL?
Though it may be somewhat optimistic and premature, gays,
lesbians, and the military may be in a more favorable position at present to
begin a process of reconciliation than the Japanese Americans were in
their campaign for reparations in the 1960s. The repeal of DADT followed
a sequence of changes in public opinion,' 93 attitudes, 194 and law that
coalesced to make the change all but inevitable. Japanese Americans did
not reach a similar stage until the 1980s, when the legal landscape was
changed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Korematsu and Hirabayashi
cases.
However, while many cases challenging discrimination under DADT
will benefit from Lawrence and the Holder-Obama interpretation of the
proper analysis of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,
the strategy of litigation as the sole means of obtaining group remedies
would still encounter a significant number of obstacles. By necessity,
litigation would focus strongly on tangible remedies, such as monetary
damages, benefits, or individual reinstatements. Though individual claims
may provide the quickest resolution in many cases, they would be a costly,
inefficient, and unpredictable way to obtain a group remedy. More
problematic is that a strategy involving a large number of individual
lawsuits would risk being characterized as an opportunistic drain on public
resources at a time of economic uncertainty, and may turn public opinion
against reparations or a reconciliation movement.
As they attempt to move forward with their lives and professional

191See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162 (2011).
192Id. at 1165.
193 See ABC News, Same-Sex Marriage,POLLINGREPORT.COM (Jun. 27, 2011, 2:12 PM),
www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm. (According to a poll conducted by ABC News and the
Washington post, 83% of the participants voted that homosexuals in the military who publically
disclose their sexual orientation should be allowed to serve in the military).
194 Generals and Admirals Who Have Signed a Statement Callingfor the Repeal of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, " PALM CENTER, http://palmcenter.org/research/Generals-and-Admirals (last
visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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relationships, mass litigation strategy focused strictly on tangible harms
may also make it more difficult, if not impossible, to heal the minds and
spirits of the victims of discrimination under the policy. It may also create
a backlash from resentful political and military opponents. Though a party
may win in litigation, a victory in the American adversarial system can
generate animosities that cannot be easily overcome. For example, a
reinstatement obtained through a court order is not a guarantee that the
individual will be welcomed back to his or her old post. In fact, in many
work-related cases, a forced reinstatement only means the individual will
face other types of discrimination, this time from a more sophisticated and
prepared adversary, rendering the reinstatement an empty remedy.
Moreover, though the social and legal landscapes appear favorable, a
number of factors caution against expectations of early success.
The 1988 Civil Rights Act was passed with overwhelming support in
both houses of Congress. In contrast, DADT was repealed during a lameduck session in which President Obama secured the necessary votes by
compromising on the extension of unpopular tax cuts that were set to
expire.1 95 Since then, Republicans, who overwhelmingly voted against the
repeal, managed to capture the House of Representatives and make
enough gains in the Senate so as to deny Democrats the ability to block a
filibuster. Moreover, despite the passage of the repeal law, the U.S. Justice
Department has continued to defend the policy, though not as aggressively
as before.196
In an article entitled Race Apologies, Professor Yamamoto
suggested a multilayered approach to racial healing that could also be
applied to cases of other subordinated groups.19 7 Yamamoto's approach
draws upon concepts of healing from disciplines such as law, theology,
social psychology, and political theory.19 8 His approach is not a universal
theory of justice, but a way to inquire and act upon real-life intergroup
tensions marked by hostility, in which participants at some deep level
desire to work to restore "broken relationships."' 99 According to
Yamamoto, in some cases, "acknowledgement of responsibilities for a

' Paul J. Richards, Lame-Duck Lessons, Don't Ask Repeal Makes History, USA TODAY
(Dec. 20, 2012, 9:56 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-12-21editorial21 STN.htm.
196See Log Cabin Republicans, 658 F.3d 1162; see also Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (2008).

'9 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 52 (1997).
198Id.
199Id.
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racial group's historical wounds may itself be enough to foster healing." 200
In other cases, "something more may be needed, because 'repentance
without restitution is empty."' 2 0 1 In Yamamoto's view, this approach
requires a dual performance.202 The oppressor offers an apology and
reparations, and the victim endeavors to forgive. 2 03
As Professor Yamamoto and others have suggested, especially
given the favorable state of the law, litigation can and must play a central
role in a campaign for reconciliation. But reconciliation requires more
than a simple declaration of a winner and a loser. It also requires a twosided commitment to a healing process. Reconciliation requires that both
sides work to find a remedy while minimizing differences and mending
relationships. As the history of prior successful reparations campaigns
show, this process does not happen very quickly.204
In an article examining litigation as a vehicle for reparations for
African Americans, Professor Charles J. Ogletree suggested that litigation
strategies are a useful first step toward insuring justice for those seeking
reparations.20 5 Ogletree also suggested that advocates for people seeking
reparations should begin to promote the convergence of interests between
themselves and the reluctant majority. 20 6 Ogletree relied on Professor
Derrick Bell's influential work on "interest convergence," which, in the
context of race relations, provides that: "the interests of blacks in
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges
with the interests of whites."20 7 Bell's analysis established that the issue of
school desegregation was not new in the 1950s when Brown v. Board of
Education was decided, because the African American community had
been attacking those policies for over 100 years. 20 8 According to Bell, the
success of Brown is best understood by looking at the gains white

200 Id at 54.
201 id.
202 id
203 id

204 Id. (It took over forty years for Japanese Americans to receive reparations, and other
reparations have also taken a significant amount of time.).
20s See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivor's Story, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 13 (2004).
206 Id. at 15.
207 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523 (1980).
208Id at 524
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policymakers stood to make if they dismantled segregation laws. 2 0 9 Those
gains included instant credibility against a growing communist movement
abroad, improved race relations with returning black war veterans, and
enabling the industrialization of the South, which was hampered by racial
segregation.2 10 Ogletree's and Bell's approaches fit neatly into
Yamamoto's multilayer design.
Applying Bell's "interest convergence" principle, a reparations
campaign for the victims of DADT and its predecessor may be offered as
an opportune, mutually beneficial next step, from which both sides can
emerge in substantially better positions. The repeal of DADT came only
after all other industrialized nations had repealed their own gay bans.
Indeed, much of the criticism of the U.S. military came in the form of
comparisons with other similarly-situated countries. 2 11 Those comparisons
damaged the reputation of the military domestically and abroad by making
the military appear out-of-touch and behind the times. As Dr. Aaron
Belkin has pointed out, a good reputation is critical to a military that is
stretched to the maximum, especially during unpopular wars. 2 12 Though
the U.S. military enjoys a great deal of support among the American
public for the difficult job it must perform, Belkin showed that DADT
damaged the reputation of the military in several ways: it was inconsistent
with public opinion; 213 media coverage of the policy had been
overwhelmingly negative;214 the policy served as a rallying point for
antimilitary activists; 2 15 and service members themselves opposed the
policy. 216
As it moves forward, the military must repair the damage to its
reputation caused by political and military leaders who insisted on
implementing a discriminatory policy when the interests of the nation
called for the deployment of all the talent it could muster. A true
reconciliation between the military and gays in uniform can only benefit a

209

d

210Id. at

524-25.
Belkin, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Does the Gay Ban Undermine the Military's
Reputation?, 34:2 ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 276, 282 (2008), available at
http://palmcenter.org/files/active/O/DADTandMilitaryRepPalm.pdf
211 Aaron

212

id

213Id. at

278-80.
214 Id at 280-83.
215Id at 283-84.
216Id. at 283-87.

32

REVIEW OFLA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol.22:1

military seeking a more favorable public image.
A true reconciliation in this case may also be made possible by a
pragmatic remedy that can benefit both sides and lead to enduring
changes. In the eighteen years that the policy was effective, the military
discharged over 14,000 gay personnel. Of that number, numerous
discharges involved personnel with critical skills, such as language
specialists (at least seventy of whom spoke Arabic); nuclear, chemical,
and biological warfare specialists; medical specialists, infantry specialists,
and intelligence analysts. Those discharges were hugely unpopular
because they reflected a triumph of bigotry over military wisdom.
Discharges of personnel in less crucial occupations were equally
unpopular when it was revealed that the military lowered its recruitment
standards because of the shortage in personnel. Importantly, many of the
individuals discharged expressed a willingness to continue their careers if
DADT were to be repealed. 2 17 Reinstatement of discharged service
members not only serves the interest of justice, it also enables the military
to redeploy a wealth of talent and experience. It may also enable the
military to avoid litigation for reinstatement, or litigation over benefits that
were denied as a result of discharges pursuant to the policy, enhancing its
public image. In addition to reinstating those who wish to continue
serving, military and political leaders must also consider a remedy for
those who were harmed by the policy. In the same manner that the
Japanese American victims of internment could not have been made whole
without a monetary remedy, the real-world harms caused by DADT and its
predecessor cannot be erased by simply repealing the discriminatory law.
Perhaps most important of all, a public apology will finally put to rest
the idea that gay military personnel were somehow lesser than those with
whom they served. A public apology will begin to restore the dignity and
personhood that gays in uniform were denied under the policy and its
predecessor. It will also enable the military to begin atoning for decades of
emotional and psychological harm caused by its discriminatory policies. A
public apology will enable the implementation of the new policy, help
create a new commitment to fairness and justice, and help smooth out the
restructuring of the institution as it lays a firm foundation for the new
changes.

217 See Letter from Juan C. Perezortiz to President Barack Obama, supra note 30.
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X. CONCLUSION
The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell represents an important step in
the evolution of this country into a fair and just society. However, repeal is
not enough to completely heal the devastating wounds caused by the
discriminatory policy. The effects of discrimination, harassment, abuse
and maltreatment continue to be felt throughout American society. It is
therefore appropriate to begin considering a make-whole remedy that will
finally end one of the truly dark chapters in American history. That
remedy should vindicate the names of those who did not live to see the
repeal of the policy, apologize for harm caused, honor the names of all
who served, and endeavor to make whole those who lost opportunities and
benefits of service for simply being homosexual. The military often says
that waging successful war campaigns first requires that the military win
the hearts and minds of those that it seeks to protect. It can also be said
that waging successful military campaigns requires that the military win
the hearts and minds of the American public. A true reconciliation with its
many gay military heroes will help it do both.

